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ABSTRACT 
The use of stock options as executive compensation, after having developed in the United States in 
the 1980s and 1990s, has spread to continental Europe in the past fifteen years. The increasing 
weight of stock options in this region of the world raises various issues and feeds a vast literature 
dealing with the relationship between corporate managers’ pay and performance. A good chunk of 
that literature is based on agency theory. In this line of thought a principal (the shareholder) 
delegates the management of the firm to an agent (the manager) and simultaneously sets up a series 
of control devices to make sure that the agent will act in his (the shareholder’s) interest (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory does not limit itself with identifying potential conflicts of interests 
between managers and shareholders: it also explores the various means through which the firm’s 
owners try to make sure that managers seek to maximize their (the owners’) objectives. Optimal 
contracting theory precisely aims at identifying such means. According to that theory, the firm’s 
compensation policies should contribute to align the managers’ interests on those of the 
shareholders – to make sure, in other words, that the agent behaves in the interest of the principal 
(Murphy, 1999).  
Such a view, applied to executive compensation plans, has been recently exposed to a strong 
scepticism. The optimal contracting theory has a weak empirical basis, especially when applied to 
stock options – whose adoption does not seem to lead to a significant improvement of firms’ 
corporate governance. Several authors have underlined the importance of “pay without 
performance” (Murphy, 1999). Most empirical studies cannot find a positive relationship between 
the adoption of stock option plans and a significant improvement in firms’ performance.  
Several explanations have been proposed to explain that puzzle (such as, for instance, Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004), all linked to rent extraction theory. According such theory, managers extract a rent 
from their position: concretely, they increase their capacity to change their own remuneration. In 
this scheme, stock-options, by nature, cannot succeed in aligning the agent’s interests on the 
principal’s; on the contrary, they strengthen or create new agency problems. 
This discussion can be linked to the theme of stock-options accounting and disclosure, which has 
been recently transformed by the adoption of international accounting standards in most developed 
economies. Indeed, according to the IFRS 2, stock-options are to be accounted for as labour costs, 
implying an increase of net liabilities within a specific reserve, with a value equal to the fair value 
of the options. This accounting method breaks significantly with the past, when disclosure of stock-
options plans were left to the discretion of firms. Such a change in disclosure rules might have an 
impact on the corporate governance of European firms. Indeed, according to a growing literature 
(see Verrecchia, 2001, for an exhaustive review), disclosure (which can be defined as the 
publication of previously private relevant information) mediates the relation between a firm’s 
owners and managers. When disclosure is failing, corporate governance worsens, in that managers 
are able to hide the decisions which damage or threaten owners’ interests.  
In fact, in the current context, characterized by national and international regulatory reforms in 
favour of a more stringent disclosure, the academic discussion has shifted its focus from the causes 
to the consequences of disclosure, especially related to corporate governance (see Bushman & 
Smith, 2001).  Turning the previous reasoning on its head, one can argue that, in presence of 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts between owners and managers, disclosure acquires a 
strategic value (Healy & Palepu, 2001). In particular, a better disclosure could help reduce 
contractual problems linked to agency relations (Lo, 2003), through, for instance, corporate 
reputation. In the (international) context of the adoption of more stringent norms on stock option 
disclosure (that is their recognition, meaning, as seen above, accounting stock-options as costs in a 
firm’s financial statement), both discussions are relevant. The new disclosure of stock-options could 
help reduce the risks of rent extraction tied to that form of compensation and bring them closer to 
their role as incentives assumed in the optimal contracting theory. 
The aim of the present work is to understand whether the aforementioned change in stock option 
accounting regulation has had an impact, and what impact, on the corporate governance of 
European firms, in the light of the twin literatures cited above. The sample considered here includes 
all listed Italian and French firms, excluding financial institutions, which have carried out stock 
option plans in 2005 and 2006, and therefore underwent the change in accounting regulation 
mentioned above. The analysis relies on qualitative and quantitative data, and focuses on a few key 
indicators. 
The findings of the present research suggest that the impact of new accounting rules and more 
stringent disclosure on listed French and Italian firms is not significant. The firms under study have 
not shown any substantial change in their management or governance structure, which appear to be 
still largely driven by the peculiar power distribution proper to each country. Besides, such firms 
have not received any market premium for introducing executive compensation schemes that 
theoretically provide incentives for top management to maximize owners’ interests. In any event, 
those plans remain a minority among listed firms. 
One could argue, therefore, that in Italy and France, like other countries in the world and the United 
States in particular, stock options plans have become another instrument used by executive 
managers to obtain higher remuneration with no link to the true performance of the firm and the 
interests of its owners. Such a logic is much closer to the rent extraction theory mentioned above 
(see, for the US, Dechow, Sutton, Sloan, 1996). 
 
Introduction 
 
The use of executive stock-option plans (henceforth ESOPs) has led to intense academic and non-
academic discussions about their real capacity to improve corporate performance and governance. 
At the time those remuneration instruments were introduced, they appeared like a sound way of 
align managers’ interests on those of shareholders. Over time, however, and with a more ample 
diffusion of stock-options, the value of the latter has been questioned and they have been 
increasingly perceived as yet other ways to top up executive pay 1. In particular, their widespread 
use in the “new economy” has been criticized, and especially the lack of adequate disclosure in 
corporate financial statements: specifically the missing disclosure of stock options’ true costs in 
financial statements. 
New accounting rules have been recently devised at the international level to precisely address 
those issues. In particular, IFRS 2 requires that stock-options be accounted for at fair value in 
companies’ financial statements. That rule, together with other IASB principles, were adopted by 
member countries of the European Union in 2005, and began to be implemented in 2005 for 
consolidated financial statements, and in 2006 for ordinary financial statements. 
The aim of the present work is to assess whether those new rules regarding the accounting of stock-
options have had a positive impact on listed firms’ corporate governance, bringing back those 
remunerations instruments in line with their original objective. 
As will be clear  in the following sections, that has not happened. On the contrary, top executives, 
shareholders and investors themselves have been unfettered by the more stringent disclosure rules. 
Firms have not shown any substantial changements in their management policies, and corporate 
governance has not markedly improved – both in Italy and France, firms continue to be controlled 
and governed by small interlinked power groups. Besides, the new rules have not led to increased 
trust from the market, and there has been no market premium for those firms who, with the adoption 
of new stock-option plans, have shown, at least in theory, their willingness to introduce a pay-for-
performance system for top management (as, on the contrary happened for USA companies, see 
Abbody, Barth Kasznik, 2004). In any case, those still represent a minority. 
The logic that prevails, therefore, still refers to rent extraction theory, since ESOPS exert little 
influence on firms’ economic and market performance, while resulting mostly from internal 
corporate lobbying.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 For instance, in 2002 Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle, became the highest-paid executive in the United States with a 
basis salary of $0, tank to the $706 million earned through the exercise of his stock-options.  
 1 – Accounting for stock-options in firms’ financial statements 
 
Since the introduction of IAS/IFRS principles in 2005, listed firms at the Borsa Italiana and at 
the Euronext Paris having issued stock options are subject to the rules container in IFRS 2 – Stock-
based payments. 
 
Italy 
Prior to the adoption of the new rule, however, Italian listed companies had to comply to 
minimal disclosure obligations related to stock-based remuneration. In 2000, the Italian stock 
market regulatory authority, the Consob, had formulated several recommendations regarding 
information to be disclosed at the shareholders’ meetings and in financial statements2. Specifically, 
the Consob recommended that the information provided by directors at the shareholders meeting 
include: 
• The laying out of the rationale behind the adoption of a stock option plan 
• The beneficiaries of the plan; 
• The modalities and conditions of the plan; 
• The responsibilities of executive management for the adoption of the plan; 
• The characteristics of the issued stock; 
• The plan’s bylaws, if available.  
Information about stock-based remuneration plan presented in firms’ financial statements had to 
contain instead:  
• The description of plans adopted or in process of being adopted in the exercise; 
• The rationale behind their adoption; 
• The main characteristics of every plan; 
• The operations to be conducted for subscription or acquisition of stock. 
Those recommendations were generic and offered a very limited disclosure, whereby the 
information disclosed was often unfrequent and of little use.  
 
France 
Before the adoption of IAS/IFRS principles, there wasn’t any specific rule about the valuation 
and inscription of ESOPs in the financial and consolidated statements of quoted French companies. 
                                                 
2
 See Comunicazione Consob from February 15th, 2000, n. 11508, “Raccomandazioni in merito alle informazioni 
riguardanti i piani di stock options” 
But, as for Italy,  there were a requirement of information, addressed to three different subject for 
three different aims. 
• Information for the Public Administration, mainly to obtain the fiscal advantages related 
to this kind of operations,  for the issuing companies and for the beneficiaries; 
• Information for shareholders, presented in a different document separated from the 
management report of the CEO. It had to contain: 
- The number and the price of options; 
- The beneficiaries of the plan; 
- The number of stocks bought or subscribed 
• Information for financial statement readers: in the notes to the statements had be 
presented until the last period in which the SO could be exercised, 
- The number of  potential stocks; 
- The effect of potential dilution on EPS; 
- The options that can be exercised in the period; 
- The number of options that can be exercised at the moment. 
  
With IFRS 2, information obligations are certainly more stringent, with the shift from a simple 
disclosure to a true “recognition”. Indeed, the principle states that the issue of new stock options 
will be accounted for by an increase in personnel costs in front of a rise of net equity in a specific 
reserve. In addition, options will be accounted for at fair value. That last rule may be understood by 
the little reliability of calculating the fair value of services produced by employees and, therefore, as 
laid out in the accounting principle, it is necessary to use the fair value of stock options. 
That accounting mode, which is still today widely discussed, can be seen as the main innovation 
of IASB principles compared to previous accounting standards such as the United States SFAS 123, 
which has been modified following the publication of IFRS 2, incorporating the contents of 
international accounting rules3.  
To be noted, the IASB principle also foresees the inclusion, within the notes to the financial 
statements, of a series of detailed information that should be provided so as to make the user (of the 
financial statement) to understand: 
• The nature and the extent of stock-based pay contracts in existence during fiscal year; 
                                                 
3
 In the previous version, firms had the ability to choose between the use of fair value and that of “implicit value”, 
equal to the difference between the value of stock at grant date and the exercise price. It gave firms the possibility to 
continue to follow the recommendations contained in APB 25 of 1972. It is important to note that such choice was 
introduced following stark reactions from both the business and the political world. See DECHOW-HUTTON-SLOAN, 1995. 
• The modalities of determining the fair value of goods and services received and the 
representing instrument  
• The impact of stock-based pay operations on the economic results and equity of the firm. 
For each of these types of information, the rule sets a list of data to be provided for more 
detailed analysis. 
In the light of what has just been said, it is clear that for both French and Italian firms, the 
disclosure of stock options in information documents is doubtlessly more ample and stringent. In 
addition, with the inscription of costs in the economic accounts, the issuance of such instruments for 
the first time has also an economic and financial impact on the firm’s results. 
It is now necessary to understand the effects of those new rules on firms’ corporate governance; 
in order to so, it is useful to go through the theoretical discussions on the relationship between stock 
options and corporate governance. 
 
2. 2 – STOCK-OPTIONS, GOVERNANCE and DISCLOSURE 
The increasing use of stock options as executive compensation in continental Europe raises 
various issues and feeds a vast literature dealing with the relationship between corporate managers’ 
pay and performance. A good chunk of that literature is based on agency theory. In this line of 
thought a principal (the shareholder) delegates the management of the firm to an agent (the 
manager) and simultaneously sets up a series of control devices to make sure that the agent will act 
in his (the shareholder’s) interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is well known, indeed, that when 
ownership and control are distinct (a phenomenon first observed in the United States by Berle and 
Means, 1932), divergences between principal and agent’s interests may appear. In particular, as 
Berle and Means have written, “the group that controls the firm may better serve its own interests 
taking advantage from the firm rather than making profits for the firm” (Berle and Means, 1932). 
There are various reasons which could explain why managers could take decisions that run contrary 
to the shareholders – reasons that have been explored by the “managerial theory of the firm” for 
some time: empire building (see Williamson, 1964 and Jensen, 1974); the unwillingness of manages 
to re-distribute cash when the firm does not have investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986); 
managers’ entrenchment (REF?). 
Agency theory does not limit itself with identifying potential conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders: it also explores the various means through which the firm’s owners try 
to make sure that managers seek to maximize their (the owners’) objectives. Optimal contracting 
theory precisely aims at identifying such means. According to that theory, the firm’s compensation 
policies should contribute to align the managers’ interests on those of the shareholders – to make 
sure, in other words, that the agent behaves in the interest of the principal (Murphy, 1999).  
Such a view, applied to executive compensation plans, has been recently exposed to a strong 
scepticism. The optimal contracting theory has a weak empirical basis, especially when applied to 
stock options – whose adoption does not seem to lead to a significant improvement of firms’ 
corporate governance. Several authors have underlined the importance of “pay without 
performance” (Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Most empirical studies cannot find a 
positive relationship between the adoption of stock option plans and a significant improvement in 
firms’ performance. The few studies which find a positive correlation between the two have been 
criticized for failing to distinguish firms’ financial performance from windfall effects (an increase 
in the price of stocks due to industry or market effects). In addition, as Habib and Ljunqvist (2000), 
most of executive compensation plans include at-the-money options rather than out-of-the-money 
options, which tend to have a major impact on firms’ performance. Finally, in many cases managers 
who benefit from those plans are free to exert their own options (Core & Larcker, 2002). To sum 
up, the optimal contracting theory has not been confirmed empirically. 
Several explanations have been proposed to explain that puzzle (such as, for instance, Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004), all linked to rent extraction theory. According such theory, managers extract a rent 
from their position: concretely, they increase their capacity to change their own remuneration. In 
this scheme, stock-options, by nature, cannot succeed in aligning the agent’s interests on the 
principal’s; on the contrary, they strengthen or create new agency problems. 
 
This discussion can be linked to the theme of stock-options accounting and disclosure. There is 
now a large literature on the relationship between disclosure and corporate governance (see 
Verrecchia, 2001, for an exhaustive review). In such a view, disclosure (which can be defined as the 
publication of previously private relevant information4) mediates the relation between a firm’s 
owners and managers. When disclosure is failing, corporate governance worsens, in that managers 
are able to hide the decisions which damage or threaten owners’ interests. Information asymmetries 
are central in voluntary disclosure: managers holding more information on the firm (than 
shareholders) may reveal or hide such information (according to Verrecchia, 2001 and Jovanovic, 
1982, part of the information is made public, part remains hidden). Such a choice is influenced by 
various factors: the dimension of the firm, the importance of reported profits, and so on (see Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). The quality of regulation also influences disclosure, as Clarkson et al. (2006) in 
the Australian case. The same authors argue that it is unlikely that voluntary disclosure produces 
                                                 
4
 Here disclosure is conceived lato sensu, not, that is, in reference to the normative distinction between disclosure and 
recognition, which will be addressed subsequently. 
quality information (“good quality disclosure”), which can be guaranteed only by external 
constraints, that is regulation. 
In fact, in the current context, characterized by national and international regulatory reforms in 
favour of a more stringent disclosure, the academic discussion has shifted its focus from the causes 
to the consequences of disclosure, especially related to corporate governance (see Bushman & 
Smith, 2001).  Turning the previous reasoning on its head, one can argue that, in presence of 
information asymmetries and agency conflicts between owners and managers, disclosure acquires a 
strategic value (Healy & Palepu, 2001). In particular, a better disclosure could help reduce 
contractual problems linked to agency relations (Lo, 2003), through, for instance, corporate 
reputation. In the (international) context of the adoption of more stringent norms on stock option 
disclosure (that is their recognition, meaning, as seen above, accounting stock-options as costs in a 
firm’s financial statement), both discussions are relevant. The hypotheses formulated on the impact 
of disclosure could help address the current scepticism bearing on the positive role of stock-options 
in firms’ corporate governance. In other words, the new disclosure of stock-options could help 
reduce the risks of rent extraction tied to that form of compensation and bring them closer to their 
role as incentives assumed in the optimal contracting theory. 
A few empirical studies have explored the potential cross-fertilization between those two 
theoretical strands. In the Italian context, one can mention the work of Melis & Carta (2007), which, 
however, focuses on the nature of stock-option plans, not on the real effects of those plans (an their 
disclosure) on firms’ governance, aim of the present work. 
 
 
3 – Hypotheses of the research 
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of the accounting rule IFRS 2 makes the informational constraint 
faced by listed firms more stringent and results in a better alignment of top managers’ interests on 
those of the shareholders, which can be measured through an improvement in the stock 
performance of companies having adopted ESOPs in the period following the adoption of the new 
disclosure rules. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A more stringent disclosure on stock options enables shareholders to exert a 
more stringent control on top managers’ remuneration, and therefore a tighter control on earnings 
management by executives. 
 
4 – Methodology and data 
4.1 Samples 
Italy 
The sample considered includes all Italian listed firms, excluding financial institutions (banks 
and insurance firms), which from 2005 (for those writing a consolidated financial statement) or 
2006 on (for those writing an unconsolidated financial statement) issued new ESOPs, and therefore 
accounted for those plans following the recommendations of IFRS 2. 
It is relevant to note that a sizeable number of listed firms has not accounted for the cost using 
the faculty, offered by the same accounting principle, to avoid such accounting for stock option 
plans issued prior to November 7th, 2002, but still extant upon the date of the first implementation 
of IFRS 2. The analysis has also excluded those firms that did not accounted for stock options 
explicitly enough in their financial statements, or whose plans presented insignificant values with 
respect to the firm’s activities (generally because targeted to one or two top managers or directors). 
Finally, the sample excludes three firms that used, for various reasons, such methodology prior to 
the mandatory implementation of IAS/IFRS principles. Table 1 refers to the construction of the 
sample: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France 
The French sample has been built along similar lines, although it was based on the CAC40 
index – which includes the 40 largest capitalizations on the Paris stock-market. Of those 40 firms, 
all of them offered ESOPs.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Indicators and data 
 N. % 
Firms with SO plans prior to 7/11/2002 18   19,00 
Firms with SO plan not explained or 
with insignificant values 14   15,00 
Firms with fair value accounting prior 
to 2005 
3     3,00 
Number of firms in the sample 59   63,00 
Total number of firms with SO plans in 
2005 & 2006 
94 100,00 
 N. % 
Number of firms in the sample 29  63,00 
Total number of firms in CAC 40 40 100,00 
In line with the literature, the indicators chosen to verify the above hypotheses are of two types: 
market indicators on the one hand, and governance indicators on the other. Those indicators have 
been used in order to understand the causes and effects of the information innovation spearheaded 
by the implementation of IFRS 2. It is important to note that economic & financial indicators have 
been excluded from the present analysis. Indeed, previous empirical research has found that the 
economic/financial impact, in Italian firms’ financial statements, of the cost accounting of stock-
options, is not significant (see Quagli, 2006). 
The first category of indicators consists of measures of firms performance on the stock market – 
namely, stock prices. We collected data on weekly stock prices two years before and two years after 
the approval of the financial statement containing the new accounting rules. Data come from the 
Thomson Financial database. 
The second category of indicators measures the various effects that the new disclosure regime of 
stock options could have on firms’ corporate governance. In particular, the following aspects have 
been investigated: (i) the reactions (if any) of shareholders to the new stock option plans following 
the adoption of new disclosure rules; (ii) changes given by the board of directors to the committees 
in charge of conceiving new ESOPs; (iii) the issuance of new ESOPs, or the renewal of those 
already in existence. 
As far as the first measure is concerned, the minutes of shareholders meetings, if available, have 
been analyzed, with specific attention paid to votes and questions related to new or existent ESOPs, 
in the year after disclosure rules were changed. It is a qualitative indicator, that gets a 1 value if 
there have been critical interventions by shareholders, 0 if not. Data has been collected from the 
minutes disclosed by single firms on their website. 
As far as the second governance indicator is concerned, possible changes in the board 
committees following the adoption of the new accounting rules allows u sto assess whether more 
disclosure leads to a tighter control of shareholders on ESOPs, following the intuition by Lo (2003) 
who argues that disclosure might work as an empowerment mechanism of owners with respect to 
managers. That indicator has been broken down in three micro-indicators: (i) the existence, or not, 
of a specific remuneration committee within the board of directors; (ii) the advent of changes in the 
composition of such committees after the adoption of the new accounting rules; and (iii) the 
increase of the number of independent directors within the membership of such committees. Data 
comes from annual reports (France), and, in the case of Italy, annual corporate governance reports 
filed with the Borsa Italiana (and available on its website).  
Finally, the issuance of new stock options or the renewal of existing plans could reveal whether 
the executive management truly believes in the pay-for-performance rationale behind them, or 
whether it merely represents a way to increase their own remuneration. It is assumed that tighter 
disclosure rules would expose managers to stricter monitoring from shareholders, and therefore 
disincentivize the former to adopt new plans or renew existing ones. Data comes from firms’ 
financial statements. 
 
4.3 Limitations 
 
The choice of the above mentioned indicators bears various limitations. First of all, as is well 
known to economists, it is hard to attribute variations in stock prices. Specifically, the impact on 
stock prices of a change in the independent variable (disclosure of stock options) cannot be 
distinguished from the more general impact of the disclosure of financial statement indicators and 
of all the information presented and discussed at shareholders’ meetings.  
Secondly, governance indicators might be influenced by a whole range of factors, beyond the 
new accounting rules on stock-options. Indeed, those rules have been adopted in the context of 
stronger push for more ample transparency and communication on firms’ corporate governance. In 
Italy, several reforms prior or concomitant to the 2005 adoption of IAS/IFRS rules have introduced 
principles inspired from Anglophone corporate governance into the national legal framework: one 
can cite a 1998 reform of financial regulation5; a 2005 law on savings regulation6; a self-regulation 
code adopted in March 2006 by the Committee for Corporate Governance of Borsa Italiana, whose 
article 7 is entirely dedicated to executive pay. In particular, the latter recommends that pay must be 
sufficient to (i) “attract, keep and motivate” top managers most able to manage the firm and (ii) 
align their interests with those of the shareholders in a “medium-long term horizon”. In the 
application criteria of those principles, the committee emphasizes the need to link managers’ pay 
and performance, with reference to economic and specific objectives set by the Board of directors.  
In addition, the Code specifies that the remuneration of executive directors and top managers 
should be decided by a remuneration committee, “composed of non-executive directors, the 
majority of whom should be independent”, following the aforementioned 2005 law, which added to 
article 147 of the TUF the requirement that at least one director should be independent, in the firms 
where Boards of directors have more than 7 directors. 
Data analysis is exclusively qualitative. 
 
                                                 
5
 “Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria”, decree-law of February 24th, 1998, n. 58 
(henceforth TUF). 
6
 Law of December 28th, 2005, n.262, bearing "Disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio e la disciplina dei mercati 
finanziari". 
5 – Research findings 
5.1 Market indicators 
 
Regarding the market reaction to more stringent disclosure rules, the analysis focused on 
variation of stock price after the introduction of IFRS 2. Table 2 & 3 present the results in terms of 
descriptive statistics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data shown above does not allow us to confirm Hypothesis 1. In fact, the new disclosure of 
ESOPs has led to an improvement of stock performance of surveyed firms only for 29% of the 
Italian sample and 21% of the French sample, while in other cases there has been either a negative 
change (52% of the Italian sample, 17% of the French one), or no change at all (18.5% of the Italian 
sample, 62% of the French one). 
It appears clearly that markets have not in either case reacted positively to the increate 
transparency in firms’ financial statements, which could explain an apparent lack of correlation 
between cost accounting of stock options and stock performance.  
 
5.2 Governance indicators 
As far as governance indicators are concerned, the adoption of new disclosure rules does not 
seem to have led to specific reactions from shareholders. Findings are synthesized in Tables 4 & 5, 
in relation to the three governance indicators, taken separately and jointly. 
Italy 
N. of 
firms 
% 
Significant improvement 17 29,00 
Significant worsening 31 52,50 
No significant change  11 18,50 
Sample 59 100,00 
France N. of 
firms 
% 
Significant improvement 6 21,00 
Significant worsening 5 17,00 
No significant change 18 62,00 
Sample 29 100,00 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the tables show, neither country registers a high number of critical shareholder’s intervention 
at annual meeting – even though the number is not altogether insignificant – 25% of cases in Italy 
and 24% in France. However, it is useful to point out that, as a more detailed content analysis of 
those interventions shows, the criticisms do not arise from cost accounting of stock options, but 
rather from mere disclosure in notes. 
A similar result can be found looking at changes in remuneration committees. In 20% of cases 
in the Italian sample, and 27,5% in the French sample, there has been a change in the composition 
and almost in the ¾ of these cases there has been an increased in the number of independent 
members in such committees; but that trend might be attributed not only to the newly adopted IASB 
rules, but to a broad range of factors associated with the adoption of the Anglophone corporate 
governance model in continental European countries (such as the regulatory reforms mentioned 
above). 
In the light of the aforementioned findings, the data regarding the issue of new ESOPs and the 
renewal of existing ones raise interpretative problems. A significant number of sampled Italian 
firms (25%) and all the sampled French firms have indeed adopted new ESOPs in the two years 
Italy N. % 
Critical shareholders’ intervention at 
annual meeting 
14   24,00 
Change in remuneration committee 12   20,00 
Issue of new ESOPs, or renewal of 
existing ones 
14   24,00 
Shareholder’s intervention and change 
in committee 
5     8,50 
Shareholder’s intervention and new 
ESOPs 
7   12,00 
Sample 59 100,00 
France N. % 
Critical shareholders’ intervention at 
annual meeting 
7 24,00 
Change in remuneration committee 8 27,50 
Issue of new ESOPs, or renewal of 
existing ones 
29 100,00 
Shareholder’s intervention and change 
in committee 
2 7,00 
Shareholder’s intervention and new 
ESOPs 
7  24,00 
Sample 29 100,00 
following the adoption of IFRS 2. However, it is difficult to assess whether such new issues / 
renewals derive from an increased effectiveness in aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests, 
consistent with the optimal contracting theory. It is unlikely to be the case, but a more definitive 
answer to that question might arise only from a more detailed inquiry. 
Moreover, analyzing the various indicators jointly and not separately, it appears that there is a 
very low concomitance of positive answers on both of those accounts (such as the intervention of 
shareholders AND the issue of new ESOPs). 
From what has been said above, it appears therefore that the introduction of new accounting 
rules and a tighter disclosure on listed French and Italian firms has not led to significant changes in 
terms of their corporate governance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Our research does not confirm the two hypotheses presented and discussed above. One cannot, 
however, exclude that such hypotheses could be useful to conduct more detailed research on the 
relationship between remuneration policies, accounting rules and corporate governance. Moreover, 
the results presented here certainly reflect the specific characteristics of the French and Italian 
contexts. In other words, firms’ corporate governance is strongly influenced, if not shaped, by 
institutional factors often associated with national frameworks. The United states context, 
characterized by dispersed ownership, public companies, a tradition of shareholder activism, an 
active market for corporate control, could offer a more favourable field to test the hypotheses 
discussed here, as other works hint, such as, for instance, the study of dividend policies in US and 
Japanese firms by Dewenter and Warther (1998). 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the previous section, the present research has shed light on the 
increased scrutiny faced by stock option plans, both in France and Italy, which could give support to 
a looser version of Hypothesis 1, whereby closer scrutiny on executive pay, fed by tighter 
disclosure rules could lead to a higher correlation between pay and performance, more consistent 
with the optimal contracting theory delineated above. In particular, the new accounting rules on 
stock options could increase executive directors and top managers’ caution in resorting to such 
forms of remuneration, given the potential damage they could give to firms’ reputation, which, as 
pointed out in the first section, constitutes a relevant part of firms’ immaterial assets. 
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